with noise traders in forex markets. We focus on two simple rules: …xed exchange rates and in ‡ation targeting. We contrast the above two rules against optimal policy with commitment under productivity shocks. In general, the presence of noise traders increases the desirability of a …xed exchange rate regime. We also evaluate the welfare impact of Tobin taxes in such a milieu. These taxes help unambiguously in the absence of productivity shocks; their welfare impact under productivity shocks depends on the monetary regime in place and trade elasticity between domestic and foreign goods.
Introduction
There exists a large literature which focuses on market microstructure models that examine the role of noise traders in generating excess volatility in the foreign exchange market. This paper incorporates noise traders into a small open economy with incomplete markets and examines the role of monetary policy and Tobin taxes in such a setup. Within this setting, we welfare-rank two simple rules, namely a …xed exchange rate regime (PEG) and an in ‡ation rate targeting regime (IT) by comparing them with optimal policy under commitment. Our objective is to identify the simple rule that in terms of welfare is closest to the optimal monetary policy under commitment. In addition, we examine the welfare implications of imposing Tobin taxes in such a setup.
Our results show that the di¤erences in welfare across these regimes can be mapped with the real exchange rate volatility that the regimes allow relative to what optimal policy calls for. The analysis shows that in the face of productivity shocks, optimal monetary policy calls for a signi…cantly lower volatility of the real exchange rate in the presence of noise traders.
It therefore follows that a PEG outperforms an IT regime when there are noise traders in the economy. Further, we …nd in such a setup, the impact of Tobin taxes on welfare is critically dependent on the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, the PEG regime is preferred under complete …nancial markets whereas an IT regime is welfare superior under incomplete markets. In contrast, we show that if there are noise traders in the economy, then even with incomplete markets and a high elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, a PEG outperforms an IT regime.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model with noise traders. Section 3 studies and welfare ranks the alternative monetary policy arrangements.
Section 4 provides a summary of the results and concludes.
The Model

Households
The framework is a small open economy with incomplete markets and closely follows De Paoli (2009b) . The world economy is populated with a continuum of household of unit mass, where the fraction of the population in the segment [0; n) belongs to the home country, H; and the remainder of the world population in the segment [n; 1] belongs to the foreign 2 country, F . The utility function of the representative household in country H is
where C t is individual consumption stream, is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, is equivalent to the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply, t is the shock to productivity, and y t (z) is output of home-produced di¤erentiated good z. The consumption aggregate for countries H and F are given by:
The parameter > 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign produced goods, C H and C F . The parameter determining home consumer's preferences for foreign goods, (1 v) is a function of the relative size of the foreign economy, (1 n), and of the degree of openness, ; more speci…cally, we follow De Paoli (2009b) and Sutherland (2002) in assuming (1 ) = (1 n) and = n . Further, it is assumed that 6 = , which gives rise to "home bias" in consumption. It turns out that this feature gives rise to deviations from purchasing power parity. "Home bias", as in their papers implies that home agents give a higher weight to home goods and foreign agents attach a higher weight to foreign goods. The home (foreign) consumption of domestic and foreign produced goods is given by C H (C H ) and C F (C F ), respectively, where:
where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the di¤erentiated goods. The corresponding price indices are
3 where P X (P X ) is the price sub-index for goods produced in country X in the domestic (foreign) currency. The sub-indices are given by
Following De Paoli (2009b), we assume the law of one price holds for each individual di¤er-entiated goods and is given by:
where S t denotes the nominal exchange rate de…ned as the amount of home currency units (peso) required to buy one unit of the foreign currency (dollar). It follows from equations (7)- (9) that
Substituting equation (10) in equation (5) we get
Comparing equation (11) with equation (6) and noting 6 = it is easy to see that P 6 = SP .
In other words owing to the presence of "home bias", PPP does not hold even when the law of one price holds.
The preference structure leads to the total demand for a di¤erentiated good h, produced
where the real exchange rate Q SP =P .
Following De Paoli (2009b) , the demand side of the small open economy (n ! 0) can be written in log-linear form as
where y is the home output, q is the real exchange rate and c t is the foreign consumption, all expressed in log-linear terms. The parameter =
, measures the sensitivity of domestic demand to movements in the real exchange rate and is a function of the degree of openness in the economy .
Price setting
Prices are set following the standard Calvo formulation the optimal choice of producers who can set price at time t, can be summarized by
where is the fraction of …rms do not change prices and e p (h) is the optimally adjusted price. Therefore, the price index evolves as
Following Benigno and Benigno (2003) and De Paoli (2009b) , it can be shown that (14) and (15) can be …rst order approximated by
where k = (1 ) (1 ) = (1 + ). Equation (16) is the supply side of the economy represented in log linear form. The price setting problem facing …rms in the rest of the world is identical to those of the domestic …rms.
International Markets
The budget constraint of the individual domestic household in country H is given by,
where P t is the overall price index in the home country, P H;t is the price index of the domestically produced good, i t is the nominal interest rate, T t is the income tax, t is 5 the government transfer and B t is the non-state-contingent risk-free bonds denominated in the local currency (peso). We follow Devereux and Engel (2002) in assuming that home households can directly trade only in peso-nominal bonds but cannot trade directly in dollardenominated bonds. All trading in dollar-bonds is carried out by specialized forex dealers who act in the interest of home households. Households take f t or the net payment they receive from the dealers as given. The net payment f t is the pro…t from carry trading, denominated in peso. Given the above speci…cation, we can write the small open economy's optimal intertemporal choice as
As the foreign economy is large and closed, foreign households are assumed to trade only in dollar-bonds. Their intertemporal choice is given by
As in Jeanne and Rose (2002), forex traders are modeled as overlapping generation of investors who live for two periods. In the …rst period of their lives they borrow funds from the households and purchase dollar-denominated bonds B F . In the following period, the trader sells the foreign bonds and transfers all proceeds net of taxes, to its owners. Thus, the transfer f t from the traders to households every period is given by:
where $ t is the net return from the trading before tax. The …rst component of $ t denotes the amount households receive in period t from the foreign exchange dealer. The second component denotes the pre-tax amounts repaid to the household. S t denotes the nominal exchange rate, and denotes the sum of the forex trading tax that the government collects from the dealers. Further, to avoid non-stationarity of key variables such as consumption and current account, we assume, in the spirit of Schmidtt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) , that the world interest rate applicable to the small open economy is subject to an intermediation cost, , increasing in net real foreign debt position 0 < 0. i.e.
The trader j born at t maximizes
where E j t refers to the conditional expectation of trader j at time t, and $ t+1 the net return from trading. Following the literature, we assume 1 the real foreign trading tax (X) = 0:5 X 2 . The trader's …rst order condition is given by:
Equations (22) and (23) This non-fundamental trade is useful for discussing potential gains from …nancial transaction taxes: if noise trading introduces an excess volatility in the real economy, a transaction tax which may be expected to curb noise trading may thereby also reduce noise-trade-driven excess real volatility. Formally, the informed traders have the model-consistent rational forecast,
and the noise traders have
where v t is white noise with its variance 
Market Clearing
The market clearing of the domestic bond market requires
where the left-hand side is the amount of fund lent by household and the right-hand side is the amount of foreign bond purchased in the domestic currency. The government runs a balanced budget, which implies
Combining equations (17), (26) and (27), we get the economy's current account which can be expressed in log linear form as (See Appendix A.1 for details)
Combining equations (23)- (25), we get (See Appendix A.2 for details)
which can be expressed in in log-linear form as
where & is the fraction of noise traders, denotes the elasticity of borrowing cost with respect to net real foreign bond. The above equation represents the uncovered interest parity condition in the economy. We therefore interpret v t ; the noise term as a shock to the risk premium. Equations (13), (16), (28) and (30) are a summary of the models equilibrium
conditions. An analogous set of expressions characterize the world economy. In what follows, we solely focus on shocks to the small open economy. It is assumed that the world economy is in steady state and c t = t = 0.
Monetary Policy
Having characterized the decentralized equilibrium, we are now set to evaluate and compare alternative monetary policies under risk premium and productivity shocks. We …rst derive 
where 
Optimal Policy
Given this loss function, the Lagrangian for the optimal policy under commitment is the loss function (31) subject to equations (13), (16), (28) and (30) as below:
The optimal policy then is characterized by the system of the following …rst order conditions As shown by De Paoli (2009b), when = = 0, it can be shown that the optimal policy can be written as
where
and x T t+1 denotes a targeting value for variable x. According to the above rule, optimal policy responds to movements in output, in ‡ation and real exchange rate. It is worth noting that the e¢ cient level of output in this special case is given by y 
Impulse Response
We next characterize equilibrium dynamics as well as welfare under alternative policies when the economy is subject to the risk premium shocks v t and productivity shocks t . Speci…cally, we compare the dynamics of in ‡ation, output, consumption and real exchange rate obtained under optimal monetary policy with those obtained under two simple rules namely in ‡ation targeting (IT, i t = t ) 3 and the …xed exchange rate (PEG, s t = 0). These exercises are conducted using the baseline parameters shown in Table 1 . We then proceed to examine how these responses are altered when we vary the magnitude of the Tobin tax.
Shocks to the risk premium
Consider now a temporary increase in the the risk premium v t . Notice that unlike the case of the productivity shock, there is no change in the e¢ cient level of output in the case of a risk premium shock. It follows that in this case, optimal policy calls for insulating the real side of the economy from the shock. Figure 1 .A shows that the movement in in ‡ation, output and real exchange rates are minimal under optimal policy. In order to stabilize demand, optimal policy raises interest rate to lower domestic consumption, which leads to higher savings and higher bond holdings. Essentially optimal policy smooths the exchange rate and allows the interest rate to rise (see equation 30). The rise in interest rate stabilizes demand and hence in ‡ation.
In contrast, an IT regime allows the real exchange rate to depreciate strongly, resulting in a sharp increase in demand. The dynamics under a PEG regime are similar to those exhibited under optimal policy. By stabilizing the real exchange rate, the interest rates absorb the risk premium shock under the PEG regime. The consequent rise in interest rate stabilizes demand and in ‡ation. This is veri…ed by Table 2 , which reports standard deviations and the welfare loss, expressed as a percentage of steady state consumption, under the alternative monetary policy regimes. The lower in ‡ation and output variability under the PEG regime results in it outperforming the IT regime. Table 2 shows that welfare under all regimes improves with an increase in Tobin tax.
Intuitively, an increase in Tobin tax reduces the demand for foreign bonds while a positive risk premium shock increases the demand for foreign bonds. Ceteris paribus, raising Tobin taxes o¤sets rise in v t in the forex market. As a result, required responses in policy interest rate are muted, which in turn miminizes the adverse e¤ects on output and in ‡ation.
Productivity Shocks
Now consider a temporary rise in productivity. Figure 1 .B shows that in ‡ation under the optimal policy stays ‡at while the output rises. Intuitively, a rise in productivity calls for an increase in output as in De Paoli (2009b) due to an increase in its e¢ cient level. This is engineered by a decrease in policy interest rate that also lets real exchange rate depreciate.
As a result, the demand for home goods rises, thus raising its output. Since the output, domestic consumption, and real exchange rate comove with the productivity shock, the real marginal cost and in ‡ation (see equation 16) remain stabilized.
Since the optimal policy entails in ‡ation stabilization, the dynamics exhibited by the IT regime closely mimic those under the optimal policy. The PEG on the other hand, by unduly stabilizing real exchange rate (Table 2) , constrains interest rate and output movements. It leads to a substantial de ‡ation and muted rise in domestic consumption and home output.
As a result, as in De Paoli (2009b) , the IT regime welfare dominates PEG ( Table 2 ).
As evident from Table 2 
Simultaneous Shocks
We next analyze the performance of alternative monetary policies and Tobin taxes when the two shocks are turned on together. Consider the following structure of shocks t = " t 1 + e ;t (32)
where e ;t and e v;t are uncorrelated i.i.d white noise shocks. Table 3 clearly indicates that under this scenario the PEG dominates the IT regime regardless of the size of elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods ( ). For > 1, productivity shocks call for real exchange rate ‡exibility with in ‡ation stability, whereas the risk premium shocks require the opposite. For our baseline speci…cation, exhibited in Table 1 , it turns out that risk premium shock takes precedence over productivity shock in the determination of optimal policy response. As a result, the PEG dominates the IT regime for Next consider an increase in Tobin taxes. Table 3 clearly shows that when > 1;
increasing the Tobin tax causes welfare to fall under the PEG while it rises under the IT regime. Recall from our preceding discussion that with only productivity shocks (but no noise traders), the IT regime outperforms the PEG; now it is the presence of noise traders in addition that makes the PEG superior. Imposing Tobin taxes in addition stabilize real exchange rate excessively and thus reduces welfare under the PEG. In contrast, since the IT performs poorly precisely because of real exchange rate instability, Tobin taxes help the 13 IT perform better. On the other hand, when < 1, imposing Tobin taxes improves welfare irrespective of the regime in place. The result follows from the discussion in the preceding paragraph where we established that exchange rate stabilization unambiguously improves welfare when < 1. Tobin taxes by stabilizing the real exchange rate therefore are welfare enhancing under both regimes. 5 
Conclusions
Our objective in this paper is twofold. is that the number of noise traders in the market at any point assumed to be exogenous.
One potential direction for future research would be to endogenize the entry of noise traders and examine its implications for monetary policy and Tobin taxes in a DSGE setup.
A Appendix
A.1 Current Account
In the Appendix, we follow De Paoli (2009b) in deriving …rst and second order approximations to the equilibrium conditions of the model. Combining equations (17), (26) and (27), we get the economy's current account
With a de…nition the real bond balance B R SB F P and the domestic household's Euler
, (A.1) can be re-expressed as
, the current account can be rewritten as
The …rst order log-linear approximation to the current account equation (A.2) around a symmetric equilibrium with zero bond holdings is 
A.2 Uncovered interest parity
The …rst order condition of the traders is given by
After substituting the de…nition of $ t and foreign household's Euler equation, we get,
The noise trader's information set is given by
where CP I;t = log (P t+1 =P t ). Taking linear approximation of (A.4), we get
where D & j = 1 if j is a noise trader, 0, otherwise. Aggregating this over j, we have
B Derivation of Loss function
Next, we proceed to derive the Loss function. We begin by obtaining a second order approximations for the Phillips equation, demand and real exchange rate. These are then useful in obtaining an expression for the loss function.
B.1 Phillips curve
The second order approximation to the Phillips curve is given by 
For v , v z , and Z t , see Appendix to Benigno and Benigno (2003) .
B.2 Demand
The …rst order approximation to the demand for small open economy goods is
The second order approximation is Using a second order approximation to the equilibrium conditions, the …rst order term, w 0 y y t is eliminated and the loss function is obtained:
To write the loss function in terms of y, q, and , we apply the following transformation using (B.4) and (B.2): Therefore, the loss function can be reduced into 
